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Dreaming—a particular form of consciousness that occurs during sleep—undergoes major
changes in the course of the night. We aimed to outline state-dependent features
of consciousness using a paradigm with multiple serial awakenings/questionings that
allowed for within as well as between subject comparisons. Seven healthy participants
who spent 44 experimental study nights in the laboratory were awakened by a
computerized sound at 15–30min intervals, regardless of sleep stage, and questioned
for the presence or absence of sleep consciousness. Recall without content (“I was
experiencing something but do not remember what”) was considered separately. Subjects
had to indicate the content of the most recent conscious experience prior to the alarm
sound and to estimate its duration and richness. We also assessed the degree of thinking
and perceiving, self- and environment-relatedness and reflective consciousness of the
experiences. Of the 778 questionings, 5% were performed during wakefulness, 2% in
stage N1, 42% in N2, 33% in N3, and 17% in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. Recall with
content was reported in 34% of non-REM and in 77% of REM sleep awakenings. Sleep
fragmentation inherent to the study design appeared to only minimally affect the recall
of conscious experiences. Each stage displayed a unique combination of characteristic
features of sleep consciousness. In conclusion, our serial awakening paradigm allowed
us to collect a large and representative sample of conscious experiences across states of
being. It represents a time-efficient method for the study of sleep consciousness that may
prove particularly advantageous when combined with techniques such as functional MRI
and high-density EEG.
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INTRODUCTION
Dreaming is a valuable model for the study of consciousness
(Kahn and Gover, 2010; Nir and Tononi, 2010). Not only is it a
common and recurrent cognitive phenomenon, it also undergoes
major quantitative and qualitative changes in the course of the
night. Sleep consciousness can take the form of short visual hal-
lucinations at sleep onset, often fades away during slow wave sleep
at the beginning of the night andmay reemerge in vivid, story-like
dreams typical of REM sleep in the early morning.
Assessing conscious experiences during sleep is a challenging
task. Mental activity is by definition subjective, and therefore not
directly accessible to the investigator, who has to rely on retro-
spective reports that are obtained after awakening the subject.
Most classic laboratory studies investigating conscious experi-
ences during sleep have used paradigms with few awakenings,
almost never exceeding six per night, often systematically sched-
uled after a fixed time in a particular sleep stage (Dement and
Kleitman, 1957; Foulkes, 1962; Goodenough et al., 1965; Ogilvie
et al., 1982; Foulkes and Schmidt, 1983; Williamson et al., 1986;
Cicogna et al., 1991; Antrobus et al., 1995; Casagrande et al., 1996;
Hobson et al., 2000). In these studies, participants were typically
asked to report the whole dream or “everything that was going
through their mind” prior to the awakening and additionally to
answer a series of questions relating to the content of their expe-
riences. Although this method has obvious advantages, including
minimal disruption of sleep structure and optimal comparability
of reports, it is also expensive and time-consuming, as the assess-
ment has to be repeated for multiple nights or subjects in order
to obtain a sufficiently large number of awakenings to allow for
statistical comparisons. Also, limiting the analysis to awakenings
obtained after a fixed time into a sleep stage may compromise the
representativeness of the sample of conscious experiences. More
recently, a few studies with frequent serial awakenings have been
published. However, these were either limited to the falling asleep
period (Horikawa et al., 2013), the first non-REM (NREM) sleep
cycle of the night (Noreika et al., 2009), or distributed over a 24-h
time frame (Chellappa et al., 2011). Only a few groups compared
conscious experiences during wakefulness and sleep in the same
individuals (Kahan et al., 1997; Fosse et al., 2001; Stickgold et al.,
2001; Kahan and Laberge, 2011).
The aim of the current study was to validate a study paradigm
with multiple serial questionings performed irrespective of sleep
stage, at pseudorandom intervals, and also during wakefulness.
In order to be more time efficient and to increase the probability
that the experience occurred immediately before the question-
ing, only the “most recent conscious experience” before the alarm
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sound was assessed. In an attempt to dissociate consciousness
from recall (Strauch andMeier, 1996), conscious experiences with
and without recall of content were considered separately. This
serial awakening paradigm has several advantages. First, obtain-
ing a high number of samples per individual allows for within
subject comparisons of conscious experiences. In particular, it
becomes possible to define not only the characteristics that are
common to all dreams and individuals, but also what is specific
to a particular dream and person (Nir and Tononi, 2010). Second,
performing awakenings irrespective of stage and of the time spent
in a sleep stage allows researchers to maximally exploit the variety
of conscious states that is inherent to sleep. Finally, this paradigm
may prove particularly useful for studies using expensive tech-
niques with a complex setup, such as functional MRI (fMRI) and
high-density EEG (hdEEG), which can benefit from minimizing
the number of study nights.
METHODS
SUBJECTS
We included seven healthy subjects [3 males, age 31 ± 8.8 years,
21–47 (mean ± SD, range)] who were screened for neurologi-
cal, psychiatric and sleep disorders during a structured medical
interview. None of the subjects was on psychotropic medication.
All the participants had a good sleep quality as assessed by the
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (<5 points) and scored within
normal limits on the Epworth Sleepiness Scale. A personal interest
in dreaming or frequent recall of dreams was not a prerequi-
site. The present study was conducted as part of a larger research
project that was approved by our Institutional Review Board.
Written informed consent was obtained from each participant.
PROCEDURE
Two weeks prior to the overnight recordings, subjects received
detailed instructions regarding the questionnaire used in the
study. They were asked to fill it out in the morning upon awak-
ening at home for this period, in order to become familiar with
reporting mental activity. Six overnight recordings in the labo-
ratory were scheduled for each participant, with a maximum of
three consecutive nights (consecutive nights are referred to as
one session throughout the text) and a minimal interval of 1
week between sessions. Recordings were started between 10 pm
and 12 am, depending on the participant’s habitual sleep sched-
ule, and wake time was set between 6 and 8 am. Questionings
were carried out pseudorandomly every 15–30min, irrespective
of sleep stage and of whether the subject was asleep or awake.
Participants were alerted by a computerized sound lasting 1.5 s.
They were instructed to signal that they had heard the sound
and to then lie quietly on their back with eyes closed. Interviews
were conducted via intercom using a structured questionnaire,
and answers were audiotaped and later transcribed. To limit the
effects of sleep restriction resulting from the study design, after
each study night participants were allowed to go back to sleep
unrecorded until 12 pm.
In order to determine how the frequency of the awakenings
may have affected the recall of conscious experiences, one subject
underwent four additional nights in which the interval between
awakenings was lengthened to 30–45min.
QUESTIONNAIRE
The interview based on the questionnaire lasted between 20 s
and 3.5min, depending on whether the subject reported a con-
scious experience and had to answer additional questions related
to the content. The features that were assessed by means of the
questionnaire are described below.
Presence or absence of conscious experiences
The first question participants were asked was: “What was the
last thing going through your mind prior to the alarm sound?”
(i.e. “What was the last thing going through your mind prior
to the alarm sound?”). Because of time constraints inherent to
the study design, subjects were instructed to report only the
most recent conscious experience (i.e. image, thought or scene)
they had before the alarm sound instead of the whole experi-
ence. Experience was defined as “any kind of mental activity,”
which included thoughts, dreams, perceptions, emotions, etc.
Three possible answers were considered: (1) no conscious experi-
ences (NCE), (2) conscious experiences without recall of content
(CEWR), when the subject had experienced something but could
not remember the content, and (3) conscious experiences (CE),
when the participant could describe the content of the experi-
ences. In case of NCE or CEWR, the interview ended and the
subject was told to go back to sleep.
Quantitative features of CE
In an attempt to quantify CE, we asked participants to esti-
mate the length and complexity of the experience by means of
four questions. For all four of these questions, subjects had been
instructed to provide answers in units of time (i.e., seconds,
minutes, or hours).
(1) Duration of CE: Participants were asked: “For how long were
you having continuous experiences before the alarm sound?”
They were instructed to give an estimation of how long they
were experiencing something before the alarm sound. It was
pointed out to subjects that they did not need to remember
the exact content of the experiences and also that this ques-
tion did not necessarily refer to the time that they thought
had elapsed since the last questioning.
(2) Duration of most recent CE: The question “How long did
the most recent experience last?” referred to the most recent
experience before the alarm sound, the content of which was
assessed by the first question.
(3) Recall back in time: With the question “How far back in time
can you specifically recall?” we aimed at assessing the “nar-
rative thread” and “continuity” of the conscious experience.
Subjects had to give an estimate of how far back in time they
could recall the content of the experience.
(4) Richness and complexity of CE: Subjects were asked: “How
rich and complex was the experience? How long would it take
to recount it?” They were told that this estimate was different
from the duration of the experience. A dream about driving
on a boring road for hours, for instance, with nothing else
happening, would be a dream with a long duration but low
richness, which could probably be recounted in 5 s.
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Cognitive dimensions of CE
We assessed five cognitive dimensions, which were chosen, based
on the literature, because they were shown to demonstrate state-
dependent variability and regionally specific patterns of brain
activity.
Participants were instructed to evaluate the degree of think-
ing and perceiving related to the conscious experience on a 5-
point scale ranging from 1 (none) to 5 (maximal). This scale
was adapted from a recent study on CE during wakefulness
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). We phrased the questions in the
following way: (1) “How much on a scale from 1 to 5 were you
perceiving rather than thinking?” and (2) “How much on a scale
from 1 to 5 were you thinking rather than perceiving?” The think-
ing score was then subtracted from the perceiving score to obtain
a composite thinking/perceiving score ranging from −4 (maxi-
mal thinking, minimal perceiving) to +4 (maximal perceiving,
minimal thinking).
The degree to which CE related to self and environment
was assessed by asking: (1) “To what degree was this experi-
ence centered on yourself rather than on the environment?”
and (2) “To what degree was this experience centered on the
environment rather than on yourself?” Again, answers were
given on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (none) to 5 (max-
imal). A composite self/environment score was obtained by
subtracting the self-score from the environment score, so that
possible values ranged from −4 (maximal self-relatedness, min-
imal environment-relatedness) to +4 (maximal environment-
relatedness, minimal self-relatedness). It was pointed out to
subjects that these questions were related but not identical to the
questions concerning thinking and perceiving. For example, one
might strongly perceive something related to the self rather than
to the environment, like pain coming from a bleeding wound on
one’s hand, without thinking about it (high perceiving, high self
relatedness); conversely, one might think about something com-
pletely unrelated to the self without perceiving it, as would be the
case when one mentally performs mathematical operations (high
thinking, low self-relatedness).
Reflective consciousness was assessed using a scale adapted from
a previous study (Fosse, 2000). Participants were asked: (1) “To
what degree were you aware that these experiences were not real?”
and (2) “To what degree did you have voluntary control over the
content of the experience?” Answers were given on a scale rang-
ing from 1 (not at all) to 5 (fully). Both scores were added to
obtain a composite score of reflective consciousness, ranging from
2 (minimal reflective consciousness) to 10 (maximal reflective
consciousness).
Other questions
Other items in the questionnaire, which will not be further dis-
cussed in the present article, referred to the presence of specific
categories of content and to the subjective estimation of the state
of being (asleep or awake).
RECORDINGS
Recordings were performed using hd-EEG with a 256-channel
system (Electrical Geodesics), electro-oculography (four of the
256 electrodes placed at the outer canthi of the eyes were used to
monitor eye movements) and submental electromyography. The
sampling frequency was 500Hz. Participants were continuously
videotaped during the sleep period. Sleep scoring was performed
over 30 s-epochs according to standard criteria (Iber et al., 2007).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Statistical analyses were performed using STATISTICA 8.0
(StatSoft©).
To determine whether CE and NCE differed significantly with
respect to time of the night and time spent within a sleep stage,
we first calculated the mean of the variables “time since lights
out” and “time spent in stage” for each category (CE and NCE).
This was done for each subject and for REM and stages N2/N3
separately. We then compared CE and NCE using paired t-tests.
To determine whether in one subject, the proportion of CE,
CEWR and NCE differed between nights with frequent awak-
enings and nights with less frequent awakenings, we used a
Chi-square test of independence for stages N2/N3 and REM and
for each subject separately.
To compare the proportion of CE, CEWR and NCE between
first nights and subsequent nights in a session we also used a Chi-
square test of independence, again for stages N2/N3 and REM and
for each subject separately.
To evaluate the effect of stage (wakefulness, N1, N2/N3, REM)
on characteristics of CE (duration richness, reflective conscious-
ness, thinking/perceiving, self/environment-relatedness), we used
a mixed effect model (as a multivariate analysis), with two inde-
pendent variables (subject and stage), and 7 dependent variables
(dream characteristics). Stage was defined as a fixed factor and
subject as a random factor (i.e. as a source of random variabil-
ity, Keppel and Wickens, 2004). Follow-up paired t-tests were
conducted on the mean values of the dream characteristics for
each subject and stage to evaluate pairwise differences between
stages. None of the variables considered deviated significantly
from the normal distribution as indicated by Kolomogoroff–
Smirnoff tests. A p < 0.05 was considered significant for all the
analyses. Note that all the analyses were carried out for N2 and
N3 separately. However, because considering these stages sep-
arately or together did not significantly change the results, we
reported results for N2/N3 together, in order to simplify their
presentation.
RESULTS
In the present article, we will focus on the phenomenology of CE
across different states of being. The results of the EEG analyses
will be the subject of a separate article.
Of the seven subjects, five completed the whole six-night pro-
tocol. One subject had to postpone the sixth night because of
personal obligations, while the other participant felt uncomfort-
able wearing the net and for this reason terminated two of the
nights prematurely and cancelled the sixth night. One subject pre-
sented two spontaneous confusional arousals out of slow wave
sleep during the second night of a session.
QUESTIONINGS
On the whole, 785 questionings were performed during 44
study nights. Two questionings out of slow wave sleep were
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excluded from the analysis because subjects were too som-
nolent or confused to understand and answer any of the
questions. Five other questionings were excluded because of
technical problems with the amplifier. A subset of 37 ques-
tionings (four study nights) will be considered separately
because they were performed with longer time intervals between
questionings.
The distribution of the remaining 741 questionings among
subjects and stages is shown in Figure 1. Mean interval between
questionings was 23.1min (±8.3), mean number of questionings
per night 18.2 (±3.4). A summary of polysomnographic parame-
ters is presented in Table 1. A typical hypnogram of a study night
is shown in Figure 2.
PRESENCE AND ABSENCE OF CE
Of the 741 questionings, 334 (45%) were associated with CE, 242
(33%) with CEWR, and 164 (22%) with NCE. Recall of CE with
FIGURE 1 | Distribution of questionings among subjects and stages.
The number at the top of each bar indicates the total number of
questionings per subject.
Table 1 | Mean and standard deviation (SD) of polysomnographic
parameters (seven subjects, 44 study nights).
Sleep parameter Mean (±SD)
Total sleep time (min) 305± 37
Sleep efficiency (%) 73± 8
WASO (min) 110± 36
N1 (min) 26± 9
N1 (%) 10± 6
N2 (min) 174± 47
N2 (%) 59± 12
N3 (min) 64± 36
N3 (%) 21± 12
REM (min) 33± 12
REM (%) 11± 4
Sleep efficiency = 100 × (total sleep time/sleep period time). WASO, wake after
sleep onset. The proportion of stages is expressed as the percentage of total
sleep time.
content was 96 ± 7% (83–100) for wakefulness, 77 ± 39% (0–
100) for N1, 42 ± 15% (22–64) for N2, 23 ± 15% for N3 (0–48)
and 82 ± 19% for REM (41–100). How the proportions of CE,
CEWR and NCE differed between subjects and stages is shown in
Figures 3 and 4 respectively.
Effect of time of the night and time spent in stage
In N2/N3, CE and NCE significantly differed with respect to the
time of the night, with CE occurring later than NCE [t(6) = −2.9,
p = 0.03] (Figure 5), while there was no difference with respect
to time spent in stage [t(6) = 1.34, p = 0.2]. Only four of the
subjects had both CE and NCE in REM sleep and could thus be
included in the analysis. Results indicated a trend for CE to occur
after a longer time spent in REM sleep than NCE [t(3) = −2.7,
p = 0.07], (Figure 6). CE and NCE in REM sleep did not dif-
fer significantly with respect to time of the night [t(3) = −1.6,
p = 0.2].
FIGURE 2 | Hypnogram of a study night with 22 questionings
(indicated by arrows at the top of the graph).W, wakefulness; R, REM
sleep, N1, stage N1; N2 stage N2; N3, stage N3.
FIGURE 3 | Proportion of conscious experiences (CE), conscious
experiences without recall (CEWR) and no conscious experiences
(NCE) across subjects.
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FIGURE 4 | Proportion of conscious experiences (CE), conscious
experiences without recall (CEWR) and no conscious experiences
(NCE) across stages.
FIGURE 5 | Time since lights out (mean and standard error of mean)
for questionings associated with conscious experiences (CE) and no
conscious experiences (NCE) in stages 2 and 3 (seven subjects). Paired
t-test. ∗p < 0.05.
Effect of frequency of awakenings
To determine whether the frequency of awakenings had an effect
on the proportion of CE, we compared two different conditions
in one subject: six nights with frequent awakenings (129 ques-
tionings, 21.5 ± 1.76 questionings per night, interval between
questionings 19.5 ± 4.3min) and four nights with less frequent
awakenings (37 questionings, 9.3 ± 2.2 questionings per night,
interval between questioning 35.3 ± 13.8min). The proportions
of CE, NCE and CWR in a given sleep stage did not differ sig-
nificantly in the two conditions [X2
(1) = 2.39, p = 0.3 and X2(1) =
0.74, p = 0.7, for N2/N3 and REM sleep respectively].
Effect of first vs. subsequent nights
To assess how the sleep restriction inherent to our study design
affected the recall of CE, we compared the proportion of CE
FIGURE 6 | Time spent in REM sleep (mean and standard error of
mean) for questionings associated with conscious experiences (CE)
and no conscious experiences (NCE) in REM sleep (four subjects).
Paired t-test. ∗p = 0.07.
in the first study night of a session (with presumably minimal
sleep restriction) to subsequent nights in the same session (with
presumably greater sleep restriction resulting from sleep fragmen-
tation during the previous nights). We found that in two of the
seven subjects, the proportion of CE in N2/N3 was significantly
higher in the first study night compared to subsequent nights of
the same session. In one subject, the proportion of CE and CEWR
decreased from 38 to 22% and from 62 to 48% respectively, while
NCE increased from 0 to 30% [X2
(1) = 8.4, p = 0.01]. In the other
subject, the relative amount of CE and CEWR decreased from 19
to 0% and from 24 to 14% respectively, while the relative amount
of NCE increased from 0 to 30% [(X2
(1) = 6.7, p = 0.03].
Learning effect
Only one of the seven subjects presented a significant increase
of the proportion of CE in the course of the experiment, which
was limited to stage N2 [X2
(7) = 17.885, p = 0.02], suggesting that
overall, there was no major learning effect on the recall of CE.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CE
A significant main effect of stage (i.e. a significant difference in
means between stages), but not of subject was observed for recall
back in time [F(3) = 3.5, p = 0.04], richness of CE [F(3) = 3.8,
p = 0.03], the thinking/perceiving dimension [F(3) = 9.2, p <
0.001] and reflective consciousness [F(3) = 29.3, p < 0.001]. For
the duration of CE and the self/environment dimension, the effect
of stage was only marginally significant ([F(3) = 2.8, p = 0.07]
and [F(3) = 2.7, p = 0.08] respectively). No main effect of stage
was found for the duration of the last CE [F(3) = 0.7, p = 0.6].
A significant effect of subject (i.e. a significant variability
between subjects) was found for duration of CE [F(6) = 6.6,
p < 0.01] and for the duration of the last conscious experience
[F(6) = 6.0, p < 0.01]. A significant interaction between subject
and stage was found for all the variables [F(15) > 2.2, p < 0.05],
meaning that the variability among subjects varied significantly
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between stages in all cases. This effect is not of primary interest in
the present study, but is reported for the sake of completeness.
How characteristics of CE differed among stages and results of
post-hoc analyses are presented in Figures 7 and 8. Table 2 pro-
vides a conceptual summary of the results. Representative exam-
ples of reports and their distinguishing features are displayed in
Table 3.
DISCUSSION
In the present study we investigated state-specific features of CE
using a serial awakenings method in which questionings were
performed irrespective of sleep stage and also during wakeful-
ness. Despite the frequent awakenings, subjects could fall back
asleep repeatedly and rapidly, allowing us to perform awaken-
ings in every sleep stage. In fact, aside from the relatively high
proportion of awakenings in N3, the distribution of awakenings
among sleep stages (Figure 1) roughly parallels the typical distri-
bution of sleep stages during a night of normal sleep (Ohayon
et al., 2004).
Overall, the results we obtained with this paradigm are in
good agreement with the literature. In particular, the proportion
of questionings yielding reports of CE is comparable to results
of previous studies. Reports of CE in our study were obtained
in 96 ± 7% of questionings during wakefulness [98% in a pre-
vious study (Foulkes and Fleisher, 1975)], in 77 ± 39 % in N1
[85–98% in the literature (Foulkes, 1962; Foulkes and Vogel,
1965; Rowley et al., 1998; Stickgold et al., 2001)], in 42 ± 15
% in N2 and in 23 ± 16% in N3 [42 ± 21% in N2/N3 in an
review of 33 NREM studies (Nielsen, 1999)], and in 82 ± 19%
in REM sleep [82 ± 9% in a review of 29 REM studies (Nielsen,
1999)]. Also, the characteristics of CE across stages are consis-
tent with previous work. The word count of reports of CE is
typically highest in REM sleep, followed by wakefulness, stages
N2/N3 and finally sleep onset (Stickgold et al., 2001). In the
present study, the variables “richness” and “recall back in time”
show this same pattern across stages. This is not surprising, con-
sidering that these quantitative variables relate specifically to the
whole content of the dream, just like the total word count. The
other quantitative variable “duration of CE” shows a different
distribution: although highly variable between subjects, it tends
to be highest in wakefulness, followed by stage 1 and REM sleep
and shortest in N2/N3. The dissociation between a long “dura-
tion of CE” and lower “richness” and “recall back in time” at
sleep onset and to a lesser extent in wakefulness suggests that
consciousness on the whole remains present for an extended
period of time in these stages but that individual CE relating to
a particular context are short and disconnected from each other.
Indeed, it is well known that hypnagogic images at sleep onset
are short and resemble a series of “snapshots” (Nir and Tononi,
2010) and that mental activity during wakefulness appears to con-
tain more abrupt topic changes when compared to REM sleep
(Reinsel et al., 1992). We did not find a main effect of stage on
FIGURE 7 | (A–D) Quantitative features of conscious experiences across stages (mean and standard error). Paired t-tests. ∗p < 0.05. Wake: 6 subjects, N1: 5
subjects, N2/N3: 7 subjects, REM: 7 subjects.
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FIGURE 8 | (A–C) Qualitative features of conscious experiences across
stages (mean and standard error). Paired t-tests. ∗p < 0.05, +p = 0.05.
Wake: 6 subjects, N1: 5 subjects, N2/N3: 7 subjects, REM: 7 subjects.
the duration of the “most recent conscious experience.” The fact
that subjects reported similar durations of the “last experience,”
for each stage suggests that subjects were consistent through-
out the experiment with what they considered to be the “last
experience.”
We found that thinking was highest during wakefulness and
that perceiving was elevated in REM sleep and to a lesser extent in
N2/N3, while sleep onset experiences were characterized by inter-
mediate scores for both dimensions. These results are consistent
with studies that have assessed the thought-like vs. hallucina-
tory character of mental activity across sleep stages (Foulkes,
1962; Goodenough et al., 1965; Rowley et al., 1998; Fosse et al.,
2001, 2004). Similar to previous studies, we found that reflective
consciousness decreased from wakefulness through progressively
deeper sleep stages (Foulkes and Vogel, 1965), reaching its low-
est value in REM sleep. As for the self/environment dimension,
only a marginally significant main effect of stage was found.
Self-related experiences tended to be more prominent during
wakefulness, while environment-related mental activity prevailed
during REM sleep and N1. To the best of our knowledge, these
characteristics have not been previously assessed by a single
score comprising both dimensions. However, thoughts about
one’s own behavior have been shown to be prominent during
wakefulness (Kahan and Laberge, 2011), while the dreamer is
known to have a passive, observer-like quality in hypnagogic
experiences (Schacter, 1976). Although the self is said to be
present in 90% of REM reports, only 3% of the semantic con-
tent of the dream describes the dream self, the rest being related
to objects, actions, person or places (Revonsuo and Salmivalli,
1995), suggesting that the environment dimension is more
prominent when directly compared to the self dimension in REM
reports.
It is likely that the sleep fragmentation and restriction inher-
ent to our study paradigm resulted in increased intensity of
sleep inertia upon awakening and that this in turn influenced
the recall of CE. In two subjects for instance, we found that the
recall rate in N2/N3 was reduced during the second and third
nights of a session, compared to the first night, when there were
presumably minimal effects of sleep restriction. Also, two ques-
tionings had to be excluded because subjects were too somnolent
to understand and answer any of the questions, and one par-
ticipant presented two spontaneous confusional arousals out of
slow wave sleep. However this effect seems to be limited, as it
was observed only for a small minority of awakenings. Also, the
proportion of CE in N2/N3 was highest late in the night, suggest-
ing that the increasing sleep fragmentation did not have a major
influence on recall. Additionally, nights with frequent and less fre-
quent awakenings did not differ significantly with regard to recall
of CE. Finally, the fact that our observations are largely consis-
tent with the literature suggests that this paradigm yields valid
results. This method may be particularly advantageous for stud-
ies using complex and expensive techniques (i.e. hdEEG, fMRI),
in which minimizing the number of study nights represents a
substantial advantage. Nevertheless, the sleep fragmentation can
be uncomfortable and one subject prematurely ended the pro-
tocol for this reason. The serial awakening paradigm is thus
best reserved for highly motivated individuals with a good sleep
quality.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our paradigm allowed us to obtain multiple
reports of several individuals in all stages and to outline
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Table 2 | Summary of characteristic features of conscious experiences across stages.
Duration of Recall back Richness Thinking/ Self/Environment Reflective
CE in time Perceiving -relatedness consciousness
Wakefulness High High Intermediate Thinking Self High
N1 High Low Low Intermediate Environment Intermediate
N2/3 Low Low Low Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate
REM High High High Perceiving Environment Low
Table 3 | Illustrative examples of most recent conscious experiences and their characteristics.
Most recent Time Sleep Min in Duration of Recall in Richness Thinking/ Self/environment Reflective
CE stage stage CE time perceiving -relatedness consciousness
I was thinking about a
restaurant I went to
yesterday.
3:34 am Wake 33 20min 2min 20 s −4 0 10
I was in a living room, with
lots of flowers and insects.
11:44pm N1 2 30min 3min 15 s 2 3 7
I saw a facebook notification
saying that a friend from high
school was engaged.
4:33 am N2 4 30s 20 s 30 s 2 2 2
I was eating bacon. 5:44 am N3 6 1min 1min 30 s 2 −1 3
I was looking at a giant
vulture. It was looking at us
through the window, in a very
mean way.
3:26 am REM 11 20min 20min 15min 2 2 2
The thinking/perceiving score ranges from −4 (maximal thinking, minimal perceiving) to +4 (maximal perceiving, minimal thinking). The reflective conscious-
ness score ranges from 2 (minimal reflective consciousness) to 10 (maximal reflective consciousness).The self/environment score ranges from −4 (maximal
self-relatedness, minimal environment-relatedness) to +4 (maximal environment-relatedness, minimal self-relatedness).
state-specific features of consciousness. The sleep restriction
inherent to this method appears to have only minimally affected
recall of CE. Our results suggest that this method provides a valu-
able tool for the study of sleep consciousness, especially when
minimizing the number of study nights is a priority.
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